Abstract: Stock markets are not merely casinos. A growing body of research suggests that access to well-functioning stock markets helps spur economic development. Of equal relevance to policymakers, countries where legal codes stress the rights of shareholders and where the regulatory system rigorously encourages corporate information disclosure tend to have better developed financial markets. Latin America suffers from relatively uninformative financial statements and relatively weak legal protection of shareholders, partly due to its Napoleonic legal heritage. Together, these legal/regulatory features help account for the comparably under-
I. Introduction
Developing country stock markets account for a disproportionately large share of the boom in global stock market activity. The value of equity market transactions in emerging economies soared from about 2 percent of the world total in 1986 to 12 percent in 1996.
1 This boom was accompanied by an explosion of international capital flows, especially flows into developing country stock markets. Net private capital flows to developing nations jumped tenfold over the past decade, exceeding $250 billion in 1996. In addressing these policy issues, this paper makes three points.
• First, stock market development, especially stock market liquidity, exerts a positive, first-order impact on economic development. A growing body of research supports the view espoused by Walter Bagehot over 100 years ago: better functioning financial markets cause faster economic growth.
• Second, particular laws and regulations materially affect the operation of stock markets. Cross-country differences in laws concerning the rights of shareholders, especially minority shareholders, help explain the level of stock market development.
Also, countries with companies that provide high-quality, comprehensive, and comparable financial statements tend to enjoy better developed stock markets than countries where regulatory systems are less effective in encouraging firms to publish useful information. In sum, countries where legal codes stress the rights of shareholders and where the regulatory system rigorously encourages corporate information disclosure tend to have better developed financial markets.
• Third, relatively uninformative financial statements combined with relatively weak legal protection of minority shareholders help account for the comparably underdeveloped state of Latin America's stock exchanges and its disappointingly slow growth. Part of these characteristics can be traced back to Latin America's French legal tradition. The Napoleonic Civil Code had a profound impact on many legal systems. The French-Napoleonic legal tradition, however, is strongly associated with relatively under-developed financial systems. 3 Once one views the strong empirical connection between the legal and regulatory environment, the financial system, and growth, Latin America's legal and regulatory systems stand out as deserving particularly careful scrutiny as it looks to accelerate economic development.
Methodologically, the paper primarily uses cross-country comparisons based on data from 45 countries over the period [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] . Each country is only one observation. Two major weaknesses of this methodology are that it does not provide a detailed evaluation of the particular circumstances of any individual country; and, it focuses attention on Latin America as a region, instead of on the individual countries that compose the region. The strength of this analysis is that it places Latin America in an international context. This is critically important. The cross-country comparisons suggest an urgency that would not emerge from a country-specific study. Namely, Latin America, on average, has notably weaker legal codes in terms of the protection of minority shareholders than the rest of the world. To an even greater degree, Latin American companies tend to publish lower quality and less comprehensive financial statements. Taking the strengths and weaknesses of this cross-country methodology together, the results offer a broad reform strategy. The results do not offer a precise blueprint of how to reform the policies of any particular country.
The paper proceeds as follows. Sections II and III discuss the theories and empirical evidence regarding the ties between stock markets, banks, and economic growth respectively.
Here, the issue is not whether stock prices efficiently reflect expectations about future corporate profits. Similarly, the issue is not whether quickly rising stock prices are good or bad. The issue is whether a well-developed stock market -a market where it is relatively easy to trade ownership of the country's companies -helps that country grow faster.
The data show that even after controlling for many factors associated with growth, stock market liquidity --as measured both by the value of stock trading relative to the size of the market and by the value of trading relative to the size of the economy --is positively and significantly correlated future rates of long-run economic growth. A growing body of microeconomic evidence supports this finding. These results are consistent with the view that a greater ability to trade ownership of an economy's companies facilitates faster economic growth.
Moreover, the level of banking development --as measured by bank loans to private enterprises divided by GDP --also helps in predicting economic growth. Since measures of stock market liquidity and banking development both enter the growth regressions significantly, the findings suggest that banks provided different financial services from those provided by stock markets.
Banking and stock market development in developing countries tend to complement each other, not substitute for the other.
Since better stock markets seem to boost economic development, policymakers have a responsibility to implement legal, regulatory, and policy reforms that promote healthy stock market development. In turn, researchers have a responsibility to identify legal, regulatory, and policy reforms that promote healthy stock market development. Thus, Section IV examines the relationship between stock market development and both the legal rights of shareholders and the degree to which the regulatory regime successfully encourages firms to publish comprehensive financial statements.
The data suggest a strong link between stock market development and a country's legal and regulatory environment. Countries were the legal system emphasizes the rights of minority shareholders and where the regulatory/accounting regime produces high quality information about firms have larger stock markets, where size is measured both by market capitalization and by the number primary market issues. Furthermore, the relationship between accounting standards and stock market liquidity is significant and economically meaningful. The data imply that one standard deviation increase in information disclosure increases liquidity by the median value of the sample. This paper then traces the impact of differences in the legal and regulatory environment on stock market development through to economic growth. Specifically, I use measures of the legal rights of minority shareholders and the regulatory regime's ability to encourage high-quality corporate reports as instrumental variables. I use these instrumental variables to extract the exogenous component of stock market development -the component of stock market development defined by the legal and accounting environment. There are good reasons to use measures of the legal and regulatory environment as instrumental variables First, they are direct policy levers. Second, the current legal/regulatory environment has been heavily influenced by legal heritage. In particular, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Vishny (1996,1997) per year. This is large, considering that median real per capita GDP growth for the whole sample is only about 1.9 percent.
Section V spends considerable space highlighting this paper's limitations. Section VI provides policy recommendations and attempts to go beyond the specific legal and regulatory variables used in this paper. There may be ways of improving the position of minority shareholders and the quality of published information on firms without fundamentally altering legal codes. These suggestions may offer practical avenues for boosting financial system development and growth.
II. Theory: Stock Markets and Economic Development
A. Finance and growth: A theoretical overview
There are good theoretical reasons for believing that the financial system influences the rate of economic growth. 4 In a frictionless world, capital flows toward the most profitable activities and it is easy to write and enforce contracts that align the interests of managers and owners. Similarly, in a frictionless world, individuals costly diversify and pool risks and easily find buyers or sellers for securities at well-known prices. But, the world is not frictionless. Moreover, theoretical debate exists about whether greater stock market liquidity actually encourages a shift to higher-return projects that stimulate productivity growth. Since more liquidity makes it easier to sell shares, some argue that more liquidity reduces the incentives of shareholders to undertake the costly task of monitoring managers (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Shleifer and Summers 1988; Bhide 1993 Are there interactions between stock markets and banks?
III. Evidence on Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth
Substantial evidence supports the view that better financial systems in general and stock markets in particular boost economic growth. Levine (1997a) compiles and analyzes this evidence. Consequently, the following sections present figures that summarize the main crosscountry findings on stock markets and growth. These involve data on a maximum of 45 countries over the period 1976-1993. 11 The section also presents new evidence on the impact of primary market development on economic growth. This contrasts with past work, which focuses exclusively on secondary market development. Furthermore, I also summarize microeconomic and time-series evidence regarding the link between stock markets and growth. Special attention is given to the joint role of banks and stock markets in facilitating economic development.
A. Measures of stock market development
This paper uses two measures of stock market liquidity. The first equals the total value of the trades of domestic stock on domestic stock exchanges divided by GDP and is called Value Traded. 12 While not a direct measure of trading costs or the uncertainty associated with trading on a particular exchange, theoretical models of stock market liquidity and economic growth directly motivate Value Traded (Levine 1991; Bencivenga et al. 1995) . Value Traded measures trading volume as a share of national output and should therefore positively reflect liquidity on an economy-wide basis. The value-traded ratio is likely to vary with the ease of trading: if it is costly and risky to trade, there will tend to be less trading.
The second measure of stock market liquidity, Turnover, equals the value of domestic shares traded on domestic exchanges divided by the value of listed shares. While Value Traded captures trading relative to the size of the economy, Turnover measures trading relative to the size of the market. Thus, a small, liquid market will have high Turnover but small Value Traded.
To measure the size of the secondary market, I use Capitalization, which equals the value of listed domestic shares on domestic exchanges divided by GDP. Although large markets do not necessarily function well and taxes may distort incentives to list on the exchange, many observers use Capitalization as an indicator of market development.
To measure the size of the primary market, I use IPO, which equals the number of initial public offerings of shares in each country relative to the size of the population (in millions). While initial public offerings may reflect many phenomena, I wanted to get some indication of external equity financing. This measure is taken from LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) . Where as the other stock market indicators are available for the period 1976-1993, IPO is measured only over the period mid-1995 to mid-1996 due to data availability.
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Finally, I use a measure stock return volatility. Specifically, Volatility is as a twelvemonth rolling standard deviation estimate that is based on market returns, where the return series is cleansed of monthly means and twelve months of autocorrelations [Schwert 1989 ].
B. Liquidity and growth
This subsection begins an assessment of whether developing country stock markets are simply casinos where an increasing number of foreigners are coming to place bets, or whether the developing countries themselves reap large benefits from having access to liquid stock markets.
The data suggest that stock markets are not simply casinos. There is a very strong link between stock market liquidity and future long-run growth. The first group has the nine most illiquid markets; the second group has the next 10 most illiquid markets; the third group has the next 10; and the final group has the nine countries with the largest value-traded ratios. Figure 1 shows there is a systematic relationship between initial liquidity and future real per capita GDP growth.
14 For developing countries, the returns to boosting stock market liquidity may be large.
Here, it is important to note that the strong link between liquidity and growth remains strong even after controlling for cross-country differences in inflation, fiscal policy, political stability, education, the efficiency of the legal system, exchange rate policy, and openness to international trade as shown in Levine and Zervos (1997a) . Thus, it is not that stock market liquidity is merely highly correlated with non-financial factors that are the real causes of economic growth. Raising stock market liquidity may independently produce big growth dividends. For example, regression analyses imply that if Mexico's value-traded ratio in 1976 had been the average of all 38 countries (0.06 instead of 0.01), the average Mexican's income would be 8 percent greater today. This forecast must be viewed cautiously, however, since it does not specify how to enhance liquidity.
Nevertheless, the example does illustrate the potentially large economic costs of policy, regulatory, and legal impediments to stock market development.
C. Size, volatility and growth
Other measures of stock market development do not tell the same story. For example, stock market size, as measured by market capitalization divided by GDP, is not a good predictor of future economic growth (figure 2), and greater stock return volatility does not forecast poor economic performance (figure 3). Countries with large stock markets appear no more likely than those with small ones to grow quickly. Nor does there seem to be a strong link between stock market volatility and economic growth. Liquidity -the ability to buy and sell equities easily -is what exhibits the strong connection to long-run growth.
D. IPOs and growth
This paper also examines the relationship between the primary equity market and long-run growth. This has not been studied before. With the full sample of countries, there is not a clear positive link between IPO and growth as illustrated in Figure 4 . This lack of a strong link is supported by regression analyses that control for other country characteristics. However, it is important to note that two countries skew these results. That is, Taiwan and Korea are the fastest growers but have virtually no recorded IPO activity over the limited time period for which I currently have data. If these countries are omitted, the positive relationship between growth and IPO becomes stronger as shown in Table 1 . Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; Easterly and Levine 1997; and Levine and Renelt 1992) . In regression (1), I control for the logarithm of initial real per capita GDP (Income), the logarithm of secondary school enrollment (Enrollment), and the number of revolutions and coups per year (Revolutions). Regression (2) also includes the average annual inflation rate (Inflation) and the ratio of central government spending to GDP (Government). Regression (3) also adds the average annual black market exchange rate premium (Black Market Premium).
IPO is positively and significantly correlated with economic growth in regressions (1) and (2) at the 5 percent significance level, when Taiwan and Korea are excluded. When also controlling for Black Market Premium, the P-values rises to 0.087. This suggestive, though still inconclusive evidence, begs further study of the ties between long-run growth and primary market development. In sum, the above analysis focuses the growth spot light on stock market liquidity and leaves , at least for now, other characteristics of stock markets in the shadows.
E. Stock markets, banks, and growth
The above analysis may elicit the following skeptical inquiry: Is there really an independent link between stock market liquidity and growth, or is stock market development merely highly correlated with banking sector development. Perhaps, banks are the real financial engines of growth and stock markets are mere sideshows. Indeed, Figure 5 shows that countries with well-developed banking systems -as measured by bank loans to private enterprises as a share of GDP -tend to grow faster than countries with underdeveloped banks. 
where u is the regression residual. If the coefficient, d, on the interaction term, SMI*Bank, is positive this would imply that an increase in stock market development, SMI, would have a bigger, positive impact on Growth, the greater the level of banking development. This was not the case, however. In all specifications, the coefficient on the interaction term, d, was highly insignificant. Taken together with the findings reported above, the data suggest that stock markets and banks are positively associated with growth. The data do not support the view that an improvement in stock market development will positively affect growth more in a country with a well-developed banking system. In sum, it is not stock markets versus banks, it is stock markets and banks. Each of these components of the financial system is an independently strong predictor of growth.
G. Other evidence
Although I present new evidence on causality below, it is worth highlighting the results of a growing body of empirical literature. Using different empirical methodologies, a variety of authors present evidence consistent with the view that finance causes growth. Taking a microeconomic approach, Rajan and Zingales (1997) show that, in countries with well-developed financial systems, industries that are naturally heavy users of external financing grow relatively faster than other industries. Alternatively, in countries with poorly developed financial systems, industries that are naturally heavy users of external financing grow more slowly than other industries. Furthermore, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) show that firms in countries with better developed financial systems grow faster than they could have grown without this access. Also, in an innovative event study, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that when individual states of the United States relaxed intrastate branching restrictions the quality of bank loans rose and per capita GDP growth accelerated. Furthermore, Levine (1997b,c) which is a common law rather than a civil law country, was also spread primarily through colonialism.
Based on the work of legal scholars, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996; henceforth LLSV) categorize countries as having predominantly English, French, German, and Scandinavian legal origins. Since English, French, and German systems were spread primarily through conquest and imperialism, I view legal origin as an exogenous "endowment" in studying the relationship between the legal system and financial sector development.
LLSV (1996) show that legal origin materially influences the legal treatment of shareholders and regulations governing corporate information. English law countries have laws that emphasize the rights of minority shareholders to a greater degree than the French, German, and Scandinavian countries. percent. Mexico has the highest value in the sample of countries. Presumably, the harder it is for minority shareholders to call a meeting and contest management the less attractive it will be for agents to participate in equity markets.
SRIGHTS aggregates these five indicators into a conglomerate index of shareholder rights.
A.3. The regulatory/accounting environment: Data
Besides the legal rights of shareholders, it is also important to consider information about firms. Information about corporations is critical for exerting corporate governance and identifying the best investments. These activities will be facilitated by accounting standards that simplify the interpretability and comparability of information across corporations. Furthermore, many types of financial contracting use accounting measures to trigger particular actions. These types of contracts can only be enforced and will only be used if accounting measures are reasonably unambiguous. Since accurate information about corporations may improve financial contracting and intermediation, the paper examines a measure of the quality, comprehensiveness, and comparability of information disclosed through corporate accounts from LLSV (1996).
Accounting standards differ across countries and governments impose an assortment of regulations regarding information disclosure and accounting standards. Thus, I often refer to measures of the quality of information in corporate financial statements as reflecting the regulatory system.
ACCOUNT is an index of the comprehensiveness and quality of company reports. The maximum possible value is 90 and the minimum is 0. The Center for International Financial Analysis and Research assessed general accounting information, income statements, balance sheets, funds flow statement, accounting standards, and stock data in company reports in 1990.
Given the importance of information in financial contracting, I expect ACCOUNT to be positively correlated with stock market activity.
A.4. Summary statistics on the legal and accounting environment The French legal tradition is clearly evident in Latin America. This region's legal system places comparatively less emphasis on the legal rights of shareholders, particularly minority shareholders, than other regions. It is also important to note the cross-Latin America variation.
The legal codes of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile actually place a comparatively high priority on minority shareholder rights, while Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela are far below the international average. In terms of ACCOUNT, Latin America tends to provide less comprehensive and comparable information about corporations to investors as shown by the low value of ACCOUNT in Table 2 . Moreover, Latin America's (overall) comparatively weak legal protection of shareholders and its relatively uninformative accounting systems have a price:
comparatively poor stock markets. Latin America's stock markets over the period tended to be smaller (Capitalization, IPO) less active (Value Traded), and more volatile (Volatility) than the markets of other regions of the world as shown in Table 2 . Finally, it is worth noting that a general index of the efficiency of the legal system in enforcing contracts (ENFORCE) is also notably lower in Latin America. As emphasized by LLSV (1996 LLSV ( , 1997 , these tendencies can be traced back to Latin America's French legal heritage as illustrated by Table 2b .
B. Regressions of stock market size on legal and accounting variables Table 3 presents cross-country regressions that examine more rigorously the connection between the legal rights of shareholders, the accounting regime, and stock market size. The dependent variables is either Capitalization or IPO. As regressors, each of the regressions includes a constant and INCOME. I control for INCOME since the overall level of economic development may influence stock market size. I want to isolate the relationship between market size and both the legal rights of shareholders, SRIGHTS, and the quality of corporate financial statements, ACCOUNT. Regression 1 includes the constant, INCOME and SRIGHTS.
Regression 2 includes a constant, INCOME, and ACCOUNT. Regression 3 includes all of the explanatory variables.
The data indicate a strong link between SRIGHTS and ACCOUNT. Both SRIGHTS and ACCOUNT enter all of the regressions with positive and significant coefficients (at the 0.05 level). Even after controlling for the level of real per capita GDP, countries with legal systems that emphasize the rights of shareholders -especially minority shareholders -enjoy larger markets. Similarly, countries that have regulatory/accounting regimes that produce comparable and comprehensive information about firms tend to have larger stock markets. The data also suggest that the links are economically large. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in ACCOUNT (12) translates into a 0.144 rise in Capitalization (0.144=12*0.12), which is a bit less than the median value of Capitalization (0.19).
C. Regression of stock market liquidity on legal and accounting variables
The data also indicate a strong link between stock market liquidity and the availability of high quality information about firms. As shown in Table 4 , there is a statistically significant relationship between ACCOUNT and the two measures of stock market liquidity, Value Traded and Turnover when controlling for the legal rights of shareholders. In contrast, shareholder rights do not have a very robust link with stock market liquidity. This differs from the results in Table 3, where SRIGHTS were strongly linked with markets size. Thus, good information, ACCOUNT, is strongly linked with both market size and liquidity, while SRIGHTS is strongly associated with overall market size, but not with market activity. These findings stress the importance of good regulations governing information disclosure. Before continuing, it is critical to note that SRIGHTS is not simply proxying for the overall quality of a country's legal system. As shown by Levine (1997b,c) , legal variables that define the rights of creditors are closely connected to banking sector development. But, SRIGHTS is not highly correlated with banking sector development. Also, the legal rights of creditors are not highly correlated with stock market development. Thus, the legal variables are capturing particular aspects of the legal environment. They are not proxying for overall legal efficiency. (1)
where the dependent variable, GROWTH is real per capita GDP growth over the [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] period, SMI is either Value Traded, Turnover, Capitalization, or IPO, and X represents a matrix of conditioning information that controls for other factors associated with economic growth. I use SRIGHTS and ACCOUNT as instrumental variables for each of the SMI indicators and use a Generalized Method of Moments estimator.
To control for "other factors," I include three different conditioning information sets.
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Conditioning information set #1 includes a constant, the logarithm of initial per capita GDP, the logarithm of initial secondary school enrollment, and the number of revolutions and coups.
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Conditioning information set #2 includes these variables plus the government spending to GDP, inflation, and the black market exchange rate premium. Conditioning information set #3 includes all the control variables in conditioning information set #2 plus Bank, which equals bank credit to the private sector divided by GDP.
The results indicate a strong, positive relationship between the exogenous component of stock market development and economic growth. Table 5 Capitalization, and IPO all enter the growth regression with coefficients that are significant at the 0.05 level and Turnover is significant at the 0.10 level. Moreover, the strong link between the exogenous component of stock market development and growth holds using alternative instrumental variables. Specifically, I also used the dummy variables for legal origin, either English, French, or German, as instrumental variables without using SRIGHTS and ACCOUNT.
I did this because some may view the legal origin variables as better instruments than SRIGHTS and ACCOUNT because legal origin is less prone to endogeneity problems. The results with these alternative instruments are very similar to those reported in Table 5 The linkages from the regulatory regime through stock market liquidity to long-run growth are economically meaningful. For example, the results imply that if Argentina implemented regulatory changes that improved the quality of corporate financial statements from the recorded value of 45 to the average for OECD countries (65), the growth would be 0.6 percentage points faster per year. This is quire large, considering that Argentina real per capita GDP growth averaged only about 0.2 percentage points per year over this period. Furthermore, after a decade, 0.6 percentage points faster per capita GDP growth implies that each Argentinean would be earning 6 percent more per year. This is meant to be illustrative. Since the analysis does not consider any country in detail, the coefficients should not be applied to any individual country. Instead, the example serves to demonstrate the large potential costs, in terms of slower long-run growth, of permitting poor information disclosure to persist.
V. Cautionary Notes
It is important to be clear about what these results do not show.
First, the paper does not show that economic growth does not influence stock markets.
The results do not contradict the argument that causality runs in both directions: financial development influences economic growth, and economic growth influences financial sector development. Rather, this paper provides evidence for the hypothesis that the exogenous component of stock market development promotes economic growth.
Second, this paper does not examine a slew of factors that may influence the operation of stock markets. For instance, a wide range of regulations influence stock market activity beyond those summarized by SRIGHTS and ACCOUNT. These range from listing requirements, to requirements governing the trading of securities, to supervision of broker/dealers, etc.
Furthermore, the paper does not consider differences in the organization and trading technologies of individual exchanges. Market microstructure may importantly influence stock market development. These factors were omitted due to data availability, not to potential relevance.
Rather, this paper makes more limited points: legal heritage is closely linked to the legal rights of shareholders and the quality of corporate financial statements; legal and accounting characteristics influence stock market size and liquidity; and the exogenous component of stock market development is strongly linked with long-run rates of economic growth.
Third, the empirical results in conjunction with the theoretical overview do not imply that every country needs its own active bourse. Conceptually, firms and savers benefit from easy access to liquid stock markets. It is the ability to trade and issue securities easily that facilitates long-term growth, not the geographical location of the market. Thus, capital control liberalization may improve the ability of firms to raise capital both by improving the liquidity of domestic exchanges and by providing greater access to foreign exchanges.
23
Fourth, as noted earlier, this paper uses cross-country comparisons. It does not examine any single country in depth. Thus, while the paper has very clear policy implications, these must be viewed as illuminating a reform strategy. The paper does not offer a precise blueprint.
Nonetheless, the results -and therefore the policy implications -jump-out. Particular characteristics of the legal and regulatory environment are strongly linked with how well the stock exchange operates, with important spillovers for economic development.
Finally, things are changing in Latin America, and "Latin America" is not a single entity.
By making broad international comparisons, I do not focus on inter-Latin America differences.
For example, while Mexico has comparatively good accounting standards, the quality of the financial statements for the rest of the countries of Latin America average almost two standard deviations below the international mean. Nevertheless, the strong connections between its Napoleonic legal heritage, its generally weak legal and regulatory framework, its comparatively poorly developed markets, and its less than desirable rate of growth certainly make this analysis as relevant for Latin America as for any other region. It is also true that many countries have engaged in serious reforms to improve the operations of their markets. Nonetheless, the time period does not seem to dictate the results. For example, if you considers only the 1990s, Latin
America still suffers by international comparisons. For those countries that have already implemented reforms to boost shareholder rights, improve information availability, and enhance the operation of stock exchanges, this paper can be viewed as encouragement for a road already begun rather than as suggesting a new direction for policy reform.
VI. Conclusions and Policy Tips
The paper shows that particular characteristics of national legal and regulatory systems --the protection of minority shareholders and the quality of corporate financial statements --exert a major influence on stock market development. Stock markets, in turn, help determine the rate of long-run growth. Walter Bagehot argued in the mid-1800s that only excellent financial systems funnel capital to those enterprises that spur economic growth. This paper builds on the work of LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) in showing that the legal and regulatory system play enormous roles in determining which financial systems are excellent. Moreover, the paper shows that Latin America stands out. It has relatively weak accounting standards and Latin America's legal system is comparatively lax in enforcing the rights of minority shareholders.
Once one views the strong empirical connection between the legal and regulatory environment, the financial system, and growth, Latin America's legal and regulatory systems stand out as deserving particularly careful scrutiny as it looks to promote faster growth in the future.
The analysis in the paper supports a two-pronged reform strategy. First, the results motivate a detailed evaluation of the legal treatment of minority shareholders and regulatory and policy changes that can improve the quality, comparability, and comprehensiveness of information about corporations. Improvements along these lines offer substantial growth dividends.
The second prong recognizes that it is very difficult to change legal codes and searches for other means of boosting the position of minority shareholders and fostering better accounting standards. For instance, stock exchanges can promote better corporate governance through their listing requirements. As a condition to having its securities traded on the exchange, a company can be required to adopt more effective means of protecting minority shareholders. This might include (1) greater information disclosure by listed companies -both periodic reporting and requirements to make timely disclosure of special events (including transactions with affiliates), (2) tighter accounting standards, and (3) creating and promoting standards for arbitration of shareholder claims (or perhaps sponsor its own arbitration system). Furthermore, regulators and exchange officials could encourage companies to incorporate into their articles of incorporation/by-laws important minority shareholder protections that go beyond those currently required by law. These additional provisions can include (1) outside (non-management) director requirements, (2) disclosure of related party transactions and management compensation,
super-majority or outside director approval for transactions with related parties, (4) rotation of outside independent auditors, (5) periodic reporting by outside auditors to shareholders, and (6) mandatory private arbitration of disputes between shareholders and the company/management.
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